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SETTLING THE WILDERNESS
SARAH KRAKOFF*
INTRODUCTION
As an easterner by birth and upbringing, I never would have imag-
ined that issues such as the validity of agency handbooks, bureaucratic
inventories, and definitions of rights-of-way across public lands would
be the burning ones of my time. Yet throughout my adopted region of
the interior West, where public lands comprise a low of 27% (Montana)
to a high of 83% (Nevada) of the lands within state boundaries, these is-
sues, which are all questions about the scope of the authority of federal
public lands agencies, touch off deep feelings in many quarters, and for
good reason. What happens on these lands impacts local communities as
well as communities of interest throughout the nation. The country's na-
tional ecological health and heritage, resource and recreation demands,
and democratic principles are all at stake here, regardless of whether the
Founding Fathers would ever have anticipated that highly differentiated
bureaucracies would play such a crucial role in the governance of their
free country.
This paper addresses two instances of agency action on public
lands, both of which originated in Utah, but that have implications wher-
ever federal agencies wield authority. The first is a settlement between
the state of Utah and the Department of Interior ("DOI") concerning the
authority of the DOI to inventory and manage lands as potential wilder-
ness areas (hereafter the "Wilderness Settlement"). The second is a
Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") between Utah and the DOI
concerning recognition of claims to rights of way across public lands
pursuant to an old mining statute known as R.S. 2477 (hereafter the "R.S.
2477 MOU"). In both of these cases, the DOI entered into an agreement
with the State purportedly to put to rest disputed issues concerning uses
of public lands. Underlying both of these settlements is a fight about
what kind of wilderness, and how much of it, the federal government
should protect.
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. Hal Bruff, Melissa Hart,
David Getches, Hal Krent, and Ted Zukoski provided helpful feedback on an earlier draft. I
am grateful to Seth Lucia for his indispensable research assistance and to the members of the
University of Colorado Law Review for their patience and dedication.
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The approach of settling environmental disputes, whether through
formal legal settlements approved by a court or less formal government-
to-government memoranda of understanding, has been a hallmark of the
Bush Administration.1 Another example is a case involving federal re-
served water rights in the Black Canyon of the Gunnison River National
Park. 2 A March 2003 settlement between Colorado and the United
States, which allocates to the Park a prescribed water right, has been de-
scribed in strikingly different terms by the governmental parties on the
one hand and environmental groups on the other. The state of Colorado
and the United States hale it as an "historic agreement" that "ushers in a
new era of cooperation with the federal government that results in real
environmental benefits." 3 Environmental groups describe it as illegal,
environmentally unsound, and contrary to the government's own scien-
tific analyses of the water required for preserving key natural features of
the Black Canyon National Park.4 This paper focuses only on the two
Utah agreements. But the divergent characterizations of the Black Can-
yon settlement typify the conflict that such settlements engender. The
clashing responses raise the question of what, exactly, is being settled:
the contentiousness or the wilderness itself.
One thing that seems certain is that the legal battles will continue.
Both of the Utah agreements are susceptible to legal challenges. 5 The
Wilderness Settlement raises questions concerning the authority of agen-
1. See Michael C. Blumm, The Bush Administration's Sweetheart Settlement Policy. A
Trojan Horse Strategy for Advancing Commodity Production on Public Lands, 34 E.L.R.
10397 (2004) (surveying a range of natural resource cases and concluding that the Bush Ad-
ministration's strategy for increasing commodity production on public lands includes entering
into settlements that are unduly favorable to anti-environmental plaintiffs); Tom Turner, Un-
settling Development, ENVTL. FORUM, Jan/Feb. 2004, at 32 (describing the Bush Administra-
tion's pattern of settling lawsuits on terms favorable to those challenging environmental pro-
tection). See also John M. Carter, When Citizens Sue, DOJ Now Argues Against the Law,
ENVTL. FORUM, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 34 (asserting that the Bush Administration has taken legal
positions that weaken environmental enforcement).
2. See High Country Citizens' Alliance v. Norton, No. 03-WY-1712-CB (D. Colo. Apr.
19, 2004) (order denying motion to dismiss).
3. Press Release, Department of Interior, Historic Settlement Agreement Reached on
Black Canyon of the Gunnison Water Rights (Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.doi.
gov/news/030402b.htm.
4. See Press Release, Western Resource Advocates, Citizens Sue for Black Canyon Pro-
tection: Agreement Between State & Feds Fails to Protect Park, Violates Federal Law (Sept. 5,
2003), available at http://www.westemresourceadvocates.org/media/pdf/BlackCanyon-Suit.
Final.pdf.
5. The Wilderness Settlement is currently being challenged in the Tenth Circuit. See
Utah v. Norton, No. 03-4147 (10th Cir. filed June 13, 2003). Environmental groups have not
yet filed a legal challenge to the R.S. 2477 MOU, but it seems likely that they will when
Utah's claims start to be approved pursuant to the MOU's terms.
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cies to disclaim powers that no court has ever required them to disclaim.
With respect to the R.S. 2477 MOU, the legal questions focus on
whether the agency has skirted a legislative moratorium on rule-making
and also exceeded its authority by adopting an unreasonable interpreta-
tion of statutory terms. In short, in the Wilderness Settlement, the con-
cer is that the agency has given up too much, and in the R.S. 2477
MOU, the concern is that the agency is trying to accomplish too much.
The story behind both provides a window into the enormous power
wielded by agencies in the public lands context. This power, when
wielded quietly in back rooms where settlements are crafted, is unseen
by most of the public; yet it is a power, in keeping with the theme of the
conference at which this paper was presented, that raises questions of
constitutional significance.
I. THE UTAH WILDERNESS SETTLEMENT
On Friday, April 11, 2003, at 4:57 p.m., the DOI, the state of Utah,
Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, and the Utah
Association of Counties submitted a settlement agreement to United
States Federal District Judge Dee Benson, in which the Bureau of Land
Management ("BLM") disclaimed authority to conduct inventories for
the purposes of wilderness review after 1993.6 The Settlement also pro-
vides that the BLM will not establish or manage any lands as Wilderness
Study Areas (hereafter "WSAs") unless they were designated WSAs be-
fore 19937 and revokes an internal management document known as the
Wilderness Handbook, which provided guidelines for managing lands
inventoried after 1993 that were found to have wilderness characteris-
tics.8 The Wilderness Settlement was approved by Judge Benson on the
following Monday, April 14, 2003, and unless the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals sets it aside, it will bind the BLM indefinitely to its terms. 9 Ac-
cording to the Wilderness Settlement and subsequent internal guidance
memoranda, those terms include a nation-wide disclaimer of authority to
inventory lands for the purpose of protecting them as wilderness. 10
6. Stipulation and Joint Motion to Enter Order Approving Settlement and to Dismiss the
Third Amended and Supplemented Complaint at 12-13, Utah v. Norton, No. 2:96CV0870 B
(D. Utah Apr. 11, 2003).
7. Id. at 14.
8. Id. at 13.
9. Environmental groups, who had moved to intervene in the district court proceedings,
have challenged the Settlement Agreement on procedural and substantive grounds. The case is
currently pending in the Tenth Circuit. See Norton, No. 03-4147.
10. See Stipulation and Joint Motion to Enter Order Approving Settlement and to Dismiss
2004]
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Thus, although the litigation prompting the Wilderness Settlement was
limited to BLM lands in Utah, the BLM will no longer inventory its
lands for WSA consideration in Colorado, Alaska, or anywhere else.
A. Historical and Statutory Background of the Wilderness
Settlement
The story leading up to the Wilderness Settlement is not a short one.
In some sense, it begins at the end of the nineteenth century, when the
federal government first began setting aside large tracts of land so that
they would remain free from resource development.11 The idea that the
federal government could, and should, manage at least some of its vast
landholdings for aesthetic, recreational, and ecological purposes took
hold then and has enriched (or complicated, depending on one's views)
federal land policy ever since. The preservation idea reached its political
apex in 1964 when Congress passed the Wilderness Act.12 The Wilder-
ness Act declares that it is "the policy of the Congress to secure for the
American people of present and future generations the benefits of an en-
during resource of wilderness." 13 The Act contains three concrete steps
to fulfill that policy objective. First, the Act itself designated 9.1 million
acres of forest service lands to be included in the National Wilderness
Preservation System.14 Second, the Act provides a definition of wilder-
ness. Wilderness areas are those where "earth and its community of life
are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not
remain.' 15 More specifically, areas that should qualify for inclusion in
the National Wilderness Preservation System are undeveloped lands that
retain their "primeval character and influence, without permanent im-
provements or human habitation," where the "imprint of man" is "sub-
stantially unnoticeable" and there are "outstanding opportunities for soli-
the Third Amended and Supplemented Complaint at 12-13, Norton, No. 2:96CV0870 B. See
also Instruction Memorandum from Director, Bureau of Land Management, United States De-
partment of Interior, to Assistant Directors and Field Officers, No. 2003-195 (June 20, 2003),
available at http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/fy03/im2003-195.htn.
11. Yellowstone National Park was established as a "pleasuring ground" in 1872, and
other federal lands, such as the Yosemite and Sequoia areas, were granted varying degrees of
protection until they too eventually became part of the National Park System. See GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 105-06 (5th ed.
2002). The federal government also began to reserve federal lands for the purpose of conserv-
ing the resources--such as trees-found thereon. The dramatic shift from disposition of the
public domain to retention embodied both of these sets of concerns. See id.
12. 16U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2000).
13. Id. § 1131(a).
14. Id. § 1132(a).
15. Id. § 1131(c).
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tude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation," and land that has
"at least 5,000 acres of land or is of sufficient size so as to make practi-
cable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition." 16 Third, the
Act required federal land management agencies to conduct inventories of
the lands within their jurisdiction. 17 The Forest Service was to review all
primitive areas in the National Forest Service System to determine their
suitability for wilderness designation, 18 and the DOI was to conduct an
inventory of roadless areas of 5,000 acres and islands of any size in na-
tional parks and national wildlife refuges. 19
The BLM was not mentioned in the original inventory provisions of
the Wilderness Act. In 1964, the BLM lacked a legal mandate and was
viewed as the agency with the nebulous and unenviable task of oversee-
ing the "leftover" public lands-those lands that were never privatized
through homesteading or any of the other land disposal policies and yet
were never "adopted" by any of the more structured federal land man-
agement agencies, such as the National Forest Service, the National Park
Service, or the National Wildlife Refuge System.20 These orphaned and
largely poorly managed lands had to wait another twelve years before
Congress passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976
("FLPMA"), 21 finally providing the BLM with an organic act to guide its
management priorities and practices. FLPMA also contains, in § 603,
the wilderness inventory mandate for BLM lands.22 FLPMA's § 603 re-
quired the DOI to "review roadless areas of five thousand acres or more
and roadless islands of the public lands ... identified as having wilder-
ness characteristics" by 1991.23 The DOI would report the results of its
inventory to the President, who then within two years (by 1993) would
make wilderness recommendations to Congress. 24  Lands identified
16. Id.
17. Id. § 1132(b)-(c).
18. Id. § 1132(b).
19. Id. § 1132(c).
20. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2000), gave the Interior and, spe-
cifically, the predecessor department to the BLM known as the Grazing Service the authority
to zone the public domain into grazing districts and to require permits for grazing within these
districts. Public lands not otherwise reserved were, from this point on, managed for retention
by the federal government. While this was a very significant step, the Taylor Grazing Act did
no more than this, and BLM was virtually without legislative guidance as to the host of man-
agement issues that arose once retention displaced disposition as official government policy.
See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 93-94 (1992) (describ-
ing the history and legacy of the Taylor Grazing Act).
21. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784(2000).
22. Id. § 1782(a).
23. Id.
24. Id
20041 1163
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through the inventory process as appropriate for inclusion in the National
Wilderness Preservation System must be managed so as not to impair
their eligibility for congressional wilderness designation.25
In addition to the § 603 process, which specifically required the
BLM to identify wilderness-quality lands, FLPMA § 201 contains a gen-
eral inventory provision that obligates the BLM to conduct ongoing re-
views of all of its lands "to reflect changes in condition and to identify
new and emerging resource and other values." 26 The inventories con-
ducted pursuant to § 201 inform BLM's land use planning process,
which is outlined in § 202.27 There is nothing in § 201 that prohibits the
general inventories from considering the wilderness values of BLM
lands, nor is there anything in § 201 that declares that the land use plan-
ning process should exclude wilderness as a potential use. Indeed, until
the Wilderness Settlement, § 201 and § 202 were viewed as complemen-
tary to § 603 in terms of wilderness planning. 28 As discussed further be-
low, however, the Wilderness Settlement all but precludes the considera-
tion of wilderness as a potential use of BLM lands unless specifically so
identified pursuant to a § 603 inventory.29
The Wilderness Act's grand pronouncements about national policy
notwithstanding, the effort to add BLM lands to the Wilderness Preserva-
tion System was initially mired in fights over whether recreational oppor-
tunities on certain lands were truly "outstanding." 30 The BLM com-
pleted its first survey of BLM lands in Utah in 1980, recommending only
2.5 million acres for management as wilderness study areas out of the to-
tal 22.9 million acres of BLM lands in Utah. 31 Environmental groups
immediately challenged this decision through the BLM's administrative
appeals process.32 The environmental groups claimed that many parcels
were given only cursory consideration and that the subjective aesthetic
25. Id. § 1782(c).
26. Id. § 1711(a).
27. Id. § 1712(a).
28. See, e.g., Kevin Hayes, History and Future of the Conflict over Wilderness Designa-
lions of BLM Land in Utah, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 203, 213 (2001) ("[Lland not identified
as potential wilderness during the initial § 201 inventory, making it unavailable for designation
as a WSA under § 603, may alternatively be designated as a WSA by complying with § 202,
which allows for changes to BLM land use plans based on new data and changing circum-
stances discovered during the ongoing § 201 inventory.").
29. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
30. E.g., Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 72 I.B.L.A. 125, 136 (1983) (reversing as erroneous
BLM's decision to exclude a unit of land from WSA consideration on the grounds that the
scenery was only "average").
31. Utah: Final Wilderness Inventory Decision, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,602 (Nov. 14, 1980).
32. Utah: Decision on Protests to State Director's November 14, 1980 Decisions on
Statewide Inventory, 46 Fed. Reg. 15,332 (Mar. 5, 1981).
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judgments of BLM officials often resulted in the exclusion of spectacular
canyon country wilderness. 33 The Interior Board of Land Appeals af-
firmed many of the environmental groups' claims that the BLM had un-
reasonably excluded wilderness quality lands and sent ninety percent of
the contested parcels back to the BLM for further review.34 By the end
of the administrative appeal process, the BLM had increased its recom-
mended acreage to 3.2 million.35 In 1991, Secretary of the Interior
Manuel Lujan recommended to President Bush that 1.9 million acres be
designated as wilderness. 36 The entire 3.2 million acres, however, con-
tinue to be managed as WSAs, pursuant to FLPMA's requirements. 3 7
The environmental groups that formed in order to be watchdogs of
the BLM's initial inventory did not give up. The notion that BLM lands
could be something other than the nation's scrap-lands gave a vision and
mission to activists who believed that southern Utah's unique redrock
country embodied the very essence of wilderness. 38 In 1985, the Utah
Wilderness Coalition formed from a number of citizens' groups dissatis-
fied with the BLM's inventories. 39 The coalition groups surveyed the
BLM lands themselves, ultimately finding 5.7 million acres of wilder-
ness-quality lands in Utah.40 The Citizens' Wilderness Proposal was
born, and the Coalition enlisted Utah Representative Wayne Owens to
introduce "America's Redrock Wilderness Act" into Congress.4 1 Since
then, Representative Maurice Hinchey has assumed sponsorship of the
bill, and Senator Richard Durbin has introduced a corresponding Senate
bill. 42 In the 1990s, the Coalition conducted another round of invento-
ries and based on those has increased their proposal to just over nine mil-
lion acres of lands warranting congressional wilderness designation.43
Reacting against the Citizens' Proposals, Representative James Hansen
33. Id.
34. Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 72 I.B.L.A. 125.
35. H. Michael Anderson & Aliki Moncrief, America's Unprotected Wilderness, 76
DENV. U. L. REv. 413,428 (1999).
36. See Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1998).
37. Stephen H. M. Bloch & Heidi J. McIntosh, A View from the Front Lines: The Fate of
Utah 's Redrock Wilderness Under the George W. Bush Administration, 33 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REV. 473, 477 n. 16 (2003).
38. See, e.g., Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, at http://www.suwa.org (website for
the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, an advocacy group formed to protect Utah's wilder-
ness-quality BLM lands).
39. Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 37, at 476.
40. Hayes, supra note 28, at 219.
41. Id. at 218.
42. Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 37, at 476.
43. Id. at 476-477.
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introduced a Utah wilderness bill that would have designated only 1.8
million acres, with various kinds of development permissible.44
B. The Litigation Leading to the Wilderness Settlement
To date, no version of a Utah BLM wilderness bill has become law.
Nonetheless, the idea of canyon and desert wilderness has certainly
gained purchase with vast segments of the American public. The south-
ern Utah National Parks, including Arches, Canyonlands, Bryce, and
Zion, draw millions of visitors annually to the area, and many take the
time to explore the neighboring, and equally striking, BLM lands. 45 In
apparent recognition of the popularity of these areas, and in order to put
to rest the disputes surrounding the first inventory, Secretary of the Inte-
rior Bruce Babbitt announced in 1996 that the BLM would undertake a
new inventory. Secretary Babbitt explained that the reinventory was
necessary, given the conflicting proposed bills with their dramatically
different acreage amounts. 46 For the BLM to have a clear picture of
which lands warrant wilderness protection, the agency would have to
take a second look.47 In October 1996, shortly after the reinventory was
announced, the state of Utah, Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands,
and Utah Association of Counties filed the lawsuit in federal district
court that ultimately culminated in the Wilderness Settlement.48
The Utah plaintiffs alleged that the proposed inventory violated
provisions of FLPMA and the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") and requested that the court enjoin the inventory. Judge Ben-
son granted the plaintiffs their request for a preliminary injunction.49
The Tenth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and dismissed the
44. Hayes, supra note 28, at 219.
45. These four National Parks draw more than 4 million visitors each year. See http://
www.nps.gov/cany/facts.htm (visitation figures for Canyonlands National Park) (last visited
June 30, 2004); http://www.nps.gov/zion/pphtm/facts.html (visitation figures for Zion National
Park) (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); http://www.nps.gov/arch/pphtm/facts.html (visitation figures
for Arches National Park) (last visited Apr. 30, 2004); http://www.nps.gov/brca/pphtml/
facts.html (visitation figures for Bryce Canyon National Park) (last visited Apr. 30, 2004). In
2000, BLM in Utah reports more than 10 million visitors annually for BLM lands throughout
the state, with close to 1.5 million engaging in camping activities and almost 3 million in "trail
related" activities. See http://www.ut.blm.gov/ Facts&Figures/facts&figures00//ff29.htm (last
visited Apr. 30, 2004).
46. Hayes, supra note 28, at 220. See also Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Letter from Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, to James V. Hansen,
Chairman of Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests, and Public Lands 2 (July 24, 1996)).
47. See Babbitt, 137 F.3d at 1199.
48. Id. at 1200.
49. Id. at 1197.
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plaintiffs' challenges to the Babbitt inventory for lack of standing.50 The
Tenth Circuit's decision was no surprise to those familiar with environ-
mental standing doctrines. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,5 1 a
leading case articulating the requirements for plaintiffs to allege "injury
in fact" as an element of standing, involved a challenge to BLM's sys-
tem-wide process of cataloguing its lands to determine whether to realign
some lands to increase resource development options. While the Su-
preme Court emphasized the insufficient detail in plaintiffs' standing al-
legations, the underlying problem was that an internal review for pur-
poses of potential realignment sounded unlikely, in and of itself, to result
in injury of any kind.52 Likewise, as the Tenth Circuit repeatedly em-
phasized, an inventory does not of itself change land use policy in a way
that inflicts injuries in fact.53 On remand to the district court, the only
claim to have survived the government's motion to dismiss was plain-
tiffs' challenge to the management of some non-WSA BLM lands as de
facto wilderness. Plaintiffs had alleged that the BLM was managing
some non-WSA lands according to an informal interim management pol-
icy that restricted uses to those compatible with wilderness protection.
Any such informal management, according to plaintiffs, was an illegal
end-run around FLPMA § 202's detailed requirements for amendments
to existing land use plans. The court concluded that, while even this
claim did not confer standing on the plaintiffs to challenge the inventory,
the plaintiffs had alleged an injury in fact sufficient to keep alive their
claim that interim wilderness management violates FLPMA § 202. 54 In
short, after the Tenth Circuit's Utah v. Babbitt decision, no party with an
interest in challenging the legality of the inventory had standing to do so.
While the Utah plaintiffs were free to pursue the de facto wilderness
management claims, there appeared to be no interest in the case for some
time. The remaining claim languished, largely unattended, in federal dis-
trict court for five years, until the spring of 2003.
In the meantime, the BLM proceeded with the reinventory, which
was completed by 1999. The BLM identified an additional 2.6 million
acres with wilderness characteristics. Added to the initial 3.2 million
acres of WSAs from the first inventory, the total of 5.8 million acres of
wilderness-quality lands was in line with the first Citizens' proposal of
50. Id. at 1197, 1214-16.
51. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
52. Id. at 890.
53. See Babbitt, 137 F.3d at 1214 (finding that the inventory is not a "major federal ac-
tion" and reiterating that the inventory does not constitute revision of a land use plan).
54. Id. at 1215.
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5.7 million acres. 55 At that particular moment, one might have been for-
given for opining that the convergence of views on wilderness quality
acreage could lead to a federal bill for BLM lands in Utah that would set-
tle the wilderness disputes by designating somewhere in the ballpark of
5.7-5.8 million acres of these lands as official Wilderness.5 6 In hind-
sight, however, it is evident that the moment was too brief to be trans-
formed into legislation. In 2000, President George W. Bush was elected,
and new priorities took hold in our public lands agencies. Shepherding a
consensus Utah wilderness bill through Congress was not among them.
On March 31, 2003, the Utah plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to
file a third amended and supplemented complaint in Judge Benson's
court. The Utah wilderness litigation, which had lain dormant for five
years, came back to life. On April 7, 2003, several environmental
groups, including the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance ("SUWA"), 57
moved to intervene in the case. These groups had not intervened in the
initial phases of the litigation because the federal government vigorously
defended the Babbitt reinventory5 8 and had prevailed on all inventory-
related challenges in the Tenth Circuit. 59 Events of the past three years,
however, gave the environmental groups reason to believe that the DOI
was no longer interested in defending the inventory or protecting lands
identified therein as having wilderness qualities. President Bush had ap-
pointed a number of extractive industry proponents to high posts within
public lands agencies, 60 one of the most prominent of whom is Secretary
55. Hayes, supra note 28, at 223 (citing BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, UTAH
WILDERNESS INVENTORY REPORT vii (1999)).
56. See, e.g, id. at 246-47 (noting that proponents of "minimal acreage" wilderness bills,
such as Rep. Hansen's, have less factual basis for their proposals after the Babbit inventory).
57. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, at http://www.suwa.org (last visited June 21,
2004). SUWA formed as a result of the battles over the first inventory of BLM lands in Utah,
and has led the effort to introduce America's Redrock Wilderness Act. Id.
58. Turner, supra note 1, at 33 (noting that environmental groups intervene in litigation
against the government when "they can add something to the defense's arguments or when
they fear the defense mounted, generally by the Department of Justice, won't be vigorous").
59. Babbitt, 137 F.3d at 1193 (dismissing all but one claim for lack of standing).
60. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Nature of the Beast: An Introduction to the Issue, 33 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 333, 334 (2003) (describing several key pro-extractive industry appointments
by President Bush, including Thomas Sansonetti, lawyer for mining interests, as head of the
Natural Resources Division within the Department of Justice; Steven Griles, oil industry lob-
byist, as Assistant Secretary of the Interior; Mark Rey, timber industry lobbyist, as Undersec-
retary for Natural Resources and Environment within the Department of Agriculture; and most
significantly, Gale Norton, former attorney with the anti-conservation law firm Mountain
States Legal Foundation and long-time proponent of loosening environmental regulation of
public lands, as Secretary of the Interior). See also Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of
"Republican Moment" in Environmental Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1007 (2003) (noting
President Bush's appointment of Gale Norton to head the DOI and Spencer Abraham to head
1168 [Vol. 75
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of the Interior Gale Norton. 6I The Bush Administration also issued its
National Energy Policy Report, 62 which made domestic oil and gas pro-
duction a top priority, 63 and President Bush signed Executive Order
13,212, entitled "Actions to Expedite Energy-Related Projects," which
urges all executive departments and agencies to "expedite projects that
will increase the production, transmission, and conservation of en-
ergy."'64 Protecting lands for future designation by Congress as wilder-
ness is not consistent with the priority of maximizing domestic oil and
gas production.
On Friday, April 11, 2003, just a week and a half after filing their
amended complaint and four days after the environmental groups moved
to intervene, the Utah plaintiffs and the BLM submitted a settlement
agreement and proposed consent decree to Judge Benson. On Monday,
April 14, 2003, Judge Benson signed the order approving the settlement,
and dismissed the case with prejudice, retaining jurisdiction only to en-
force the settlement terms.65 The Wilderness Settlement, as described
above, disclaims the BLM's authority to conduct the inventory and also
rescinds the 2001 Wilderness Handbook, which provided interim guid-
ance for management of the tracts found to have wilderness qualities
pending amendment of BLM Land Use Plans. While the Wilderness Set-
tlement does recognize that BLM has authority to "develop land use
plans and give priority to areas of critical environmental concern," 66 this
acknowledgment does nothing more than repeat statutory language from
FLPMA § 202.67 Having disclaimed the inventory and interim standards
for protecting wilderness-quality lands, the BLM's concession of its leg-
islative obligation in § 202 provides little comfort to wilderness advo-
cates. In short, the Wilderness Settlement embodies the view that the
the Department of Energy, and describing them both as "prominent supporters of increased
natural resource development").
61. See Lazarus, supra note 60, at 1007.
62. Nat'l Energy Pol'y Dev. Group, National Energy Policy: Reliable, Affordable, and
Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future, available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/energy (last visited May 16, 2001).
63. See Lazarus, supra note 60, at 1007 (noting that the energy policy was developed af-
ter "weeks of meetings with industry leaders" and that environmentalists contend that the pol-
icy reflects "the priorities and economic interests of White House allies in the energy indus-
try").
64. Exec. Order No. 13,212, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,357 § 1 (May 22, 2001).
65. Stipulation and Joint Motion to Enter Order Approving Settlement and to Dismiss the
Third Amended and Supplemented Complaint at 12-13, Utah v. Norton, No. 2:96CV0870 B
(D. Utah Apr. 11, 2003).
66. Id.
67. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(3) (2000) (requiring the Secretary to "give priority to the
designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern").
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time for discovering lands worthy of Congress's protective wilderness
designation has come to an end, and that any lands warranting such pro-
tection that were overlooked in the inventories authorized under FLPMA
§ 603 are never to be considered as such. The "Wilderness thing" is
over, and it is time to get on with the pragmatic business of developing
BLM lands for extractive purposes.
C. Analysis of the Wilderness Settlement
It is the Executive's privilege to change the course of agency policy,
within the bounds of legislative commands. Regardless of whether the
2000 election represented a broad mandate of any kind, once the Presi-
dent is elected, it is the Executive Branch's prerogative to staff agencies
with like-minded people and to pursue policies that reflect the admini-
stration's goals, so long as they comport with a reasonable interpretation
of relevant federal statutes.68 This broad executive power drives both
environmental and resource extraction interests to spend much of their
advocacy time and money at the agency level. Agency action is where
the action is on public lands, and executive policies create the framework
in which interest groups must operate. So how is the Wilderness Settle-
ment any different?
There are two differences between the Wilderness Settlement and
typical changes in agency priorities. First, the BLM has disclaimed legal
authority that no court has or could require it to disclaim (and further-
more that decades of agency practice have affirmed). Second, the BLM
has done so in a consent decree that purports to bind the BLM to its
terms indefinitely. Thus, without the benefit of adjudication, the BLM's
position is now enshrined in law and enforceable against future admini-
strations. The point of this paper is not to declare that the Wilderness
Settlement is therefore illegal; only a court can do that, and the prognos-
tications of legal academics are rarely influential on that score. Rather,
the aim of this paper is to speculate at a level slightly removed from the
legal rights or wrongs about what settlements of this kind portend, if they
are upheld, for the future of public lands. The merits of the legal posi-
tions adopted in the Wilderness Settlement are relevant insofar as they
shed light on these larger issues, and thus I will review them briefly.
The Wilderness Settlement adopts the position that only FLPMA
§ 603 gives the BLM legal authority to inventory lands for the purpose of
68. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE 137-44 (4th ed. 2002) (ex-
plaining basics of, and conceptual foundations for, administrative law doctrine of judicial def-
erence to agency decision-making).
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considering them for congressional wilderness designation, and that
§ 603's authority has expired. 69 Utah and the BLM's position, in other
words, is that there is only one statutory source for the BLM to inventory
lands to determine their eligibility for wilderness, and that statutory
source acts as a ceiling, rather than a floor. It bears repeating that the is-
sue of the legal validity of the reinventory had by this time been dis-
missed from the litigation between Utah and the BLM. 70 By 2003, when
the litigation was revived, BLM's reinventory in Utah was complete. It
is therefore curious that the BLM was willing to revisit this issue, let
alone capitulate completely to the plaintiffs' position, particularly given
that there is no precedent in case law or agency practice to support this
"wilderness sunset" view of FLPMA.
FLPMA was passed in order to give the BLM a comprehensive mis-
sion and mandate. Part of that mandate was to incorporate environ-
mental protection into the agency's management of the lands under its
jurisdiction.71 While the BLM retained substantial flexibility in manag-
ing its lands for multiple uses, 72 Congress expressly included safeguard-
ing the ecological value of the lands among those uses. 73 FLPMA there-
fore includes reference to prioritization of environmental values in its
general inventory provisions,74 in its land use planning provisions,75 and
in its management provisions, which state that the Secretary "shall, by
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary
or undue degradation of the lands." 76
The inventory provisions of FLPMA must be seen in this general
context of balancing multiple uses, one of those uses being environ-
mental conservation, as well as the specific context of the congressional
policy of desiring input from public lands agencies about wilderness-
quality lands. In Utah v. Babbitt, Secretary Babbitt took the position that
FLPMA § 201-the general and ongoing inventory provision
69. Stipulation and Joint Motion to Enter Order Approving Settlement and to Dismiss the
Third Amended and Supplemented Complaint at 12-13, Norton, No. 2:96CV0870 B.
70. Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1206 (10th Cir. 1998).
71. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, at 35 (1976).
72. 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (stating Congress's policy and providing for multiple uses of BLM
lands).
73. Id. § 1701(8).
74. Id. § 1711 (a) (requiring that the ongoing inventory give "priority to areas of critical
environmental concern").
75. Id. § 1712(c)(3) (requiring the Secretary to "give priority to the designation of areas
of critical environmental concern" in the development of land use plans); Id. § 1712(7) (requir-
ing the Secretary to "weigh long-term benefits to the public against short-term benefits").
76. Id. § 1732(b).
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authorized the reinventory. 77  Secretary Babbitt's argument was that
even if § 603 did not serve as legal justification for the reinventory, noth-
ing therein prevented the BLM from taking a second look at its own
lands to see if wilderness qualities were missed. 78 FLPMA § 603 re-
quired the Secretary to:
[w]ithin fifteen years after October 21, 1976... review those
roadless areas of five thousand acres or more and roadless islands of
the public lands ... and ... from time to time report to the President
his recommendation as to the suitability or nonsuitability of each
such area or island for preservation as wilderness." 79
The goal of § 603 was to ensure that BLM actually completed the
initial inventories in a timely fashion. There is nothing in the text of
§ 603 nor its legislative history to indicate that, once the initial invento-
ries are complete, § 603 should become a bar to the BLM's desire to
provide ongoing information to Congress. 80 In fact, § 603 relies on the
ongoing process provided by § 201 to conduct the initial screening of
BLM lands for wilderness characteristics. 8 1 Secretary Babbitt's position
was consistent with FLPMA's specific wilderness mandate and general
structure of encouraging constant reevaluation of the highest and best
uses of the lands within the BLM's jurisdiction.
Actions by the Forest Service, the National Park Service ("NPS"),
the Fish and Wildlife Service and, until the Wilderness Settlement, the
BLM affirm that public lands agencies retain the authority to conduct
wilderness inventories outside of the mandatory reviews required by the
Wilderness Act and FLPMA. The Forest Service is perhaps the most
stunning example. The Wilderness Act required that the Forest Service
inventory only its designated "primitive areas" for consideration as wil-
derness. 82 Yet the Forest Service has reviewed more than sixty million
acres of roadless areas throughout the national forests in its Roadless
Area Review and Evaluation (RARE) inventories. 83 Courts have as-
77. Utahv. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1205n. 17 (10thCir. 1998).
78. Id. (noting reliance on § 201 in other contexts, including review of newly acquired
BLM lands).
79. 43 U.S.C § 1782(a).
80. See S. REP. No. 94-583, at 44 (Dec. 18, 1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-1163, at 3 (1976).
See also John D. Leshy, Wilderness and its Discontents- Wilderness Review Comes to the
Public Lands, ARIZ. ST. L.J. 361, 367 (1981) (explaining that FLPMA's mandatory wilderness
review provisions simply clarified authority that BLM already had to conduct wilderness in-
ventories).
81. 43 U.S.C. § 1782 (2000).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (2000).
83. COGGFNSETAL., supranote 11,at 1133.
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sumed the legality of these inventories, even though they exceeded the
scope of the Wilderness Act and took place after the ten-year deadline. 84
Congress added millions of acres to the National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System based on these inventories. 85 Similarly, the NPS reviewed
all lands within its jurisdiction,86 exceeding the Wilderness Act's re-
quirement that NPS inventory only Parks established before September
1964.87 Congress has designated wilderness areas based on these non-
Wilderness Act inventories.88 Likewise, the Fish and Wildlife Service
has undertaken non-Wilderness Act reviews of lands within the National
Fish and Wildlife Refuge System.89
The BLM also undertook to inventory lands for their wilderness po-
tential outside of the terms of FLPMA § 603, even apart from the Babbitt
reinventory. In Sierra Club v. Watt,90 a federal district court acknowl-
edged the DOI's authority to inventory lands for wilderness qualities and
to manage them as such, pursuant to FLPMA § 202 and § 302.91 The
case involved, among other things, a challenge to Secretary James Watt's
decision to delete BLM parcels of less than 5,000 acres from WSA status
and to return them to multiple use management. 92 The court upheld Sec-
retary Watt's deletion of the lands from WSA status, based solely on
deference to the Secretary's very narrow reading of the record supporting
their inclusion. The court nonetheless took the trouble to note that there
was "sufficient material in the record to support the inclusion of these
lands under § 302 and § 202 of FLPMA. '' 93 Moreover, with respect to
management of the lands deleted from WSA status, the court ordered the
Secretary to maintain a management protocol of protecting the wilder-
ness values of those lands, relying on FLPMA § 202 and § 302.94
84. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 765 (9th Cir. 1982).
85. See, e.g., Michigan Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-184, 101 Stat. 1274 (1987);
Wisconsin Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 98-321, 98 Stat. 250 (1984); Texas Wilderness Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-574 (1984). See also COGGINS ET AL., supra note 11, at 1136 (noting that
Congress added nearly nine million acres of forest service land to the National Wilderness
Preservation System based almost exclusively on the RARE 11 inventory).
86. See NPS Management Policies 2001 § 6.1 (2000), available at http://www.nps.gov/
policy/mp/policies.pdf (last visited May 1, 2004).
87. 16 U.S.C. §1132(c).
88. E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 283e, amended by Guadalupe National Park, Pub. L. No. 95-625, 92
Stat. 3467 (1978).
89. Draft Wilderness Stewardship Policy Pursuant to the Wilderness Act of 1964, 66 Fed.
Reg. 3708 (proposed Jan. 16, 2001); F.W.S. Manual 610; Directors' Order 116 (Oct. 12,
1999).
90. 608 F. Supp. 305 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
91. Id. at339.
92. Id. at 338-42.
93. Id. at 340.
94. Id at341.
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In recent times, the Colorado BLM undertook a more modest inven-
tory than that initiated in Utah by Secretary Babbitt.95 The BLM deter-
mined, as a result of the inventory, that several areas required land use
plan amendments to ensure that the wilderness values therein would be
protected. 96 In part, the inventory was intended to address lands that had
been added to the BLM's jurisdiction after 1993. For example, Colorado
BLM conducted a review of lands on the Roan Plateau acquired from the
Department of Energy.97 Colorado BLM had begun the process of
amending its land use plan for the Roan Plateau to reflect the wilderness
qualities found in the review when the DOI issued the interim guidance
document reflecting the positions in the Wilderness Settlement. 98
In short, with respect to wilderness inventories and wilderness man-
agement, decades of agency practice and court decisions support the po-
sition that FLPMA § 603, like the equivalent inventory and management
provisions in the Wilderness Act, does not limit the BLM's authority to
inventory and manage lands for wilderness protection. It is perhaps con-
ceivable, notwithstanding the weight of legal and agency precedent, that
a court would find it reasonable, as a prospective matter, to interpret
FLPMA in the way that Secretary Norton has. But it is striking that the
BLM would take the definitive position that no such authority existed for
past inventories, and then wrap that position in a consent decree. While
this administration was free to change course in terms of interpreting
FLPMA (again, within the bounds of reasonableness), it has now at-
tempted to ensure that future administrations will not be free to do the
same. The implications of this, including constitutional concerns, will be
discussed in Section IV below.
95. See Instruction Memorandum from Bureau of Land Management, United States De-
partment of Interior, No. CO-98-017 (1998) (providing procedures and protocols for Colorado
BLM's review of roadless areas identified in Citizens' wilderness proposal); Instruction
Memorandum from Bureau of Land Management, United States Department of Interior, No.
CO-97-044 (1997).
96. See Memorandum from Bureau of Land Management, United States Department of
Interior, No. CO-930 (2000).
97. Interview with Ann Morgan, Former Director of Colorado BLM, in Boulder, Colo.
(Jan. 22, 2004) (notes on file with author). The BLM has assumed the ability to inventory af-
ter-acquired lands for potential wilderness protection in other circumstances as well. See Utah
v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1205 n.17 (10th Cir. 1998) ("BLM has consistently relied on
FLPMA §§ 201 and 202... as providing the necessary authority to conduct the inventories"
on newly acquired public lands).
98. See Interview with Ann Morgan, supra note 97. See also Instruction Memorandum
No. 2003-195, supra note 10.
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II. THE R.S. 2477 MOU
The second week of April 2003 was a busy time for Utah state offi-
cials and the DOI. Recall that the Wilderness Settlement was filed on
Friday, April 11, 2003.99 Only two days earlier, on April 9, Secretary
Gale Norton and then-Governor of Utah Michael Leavitt signed the R.S.
2477 MOU. As with the Wilderness Settlement, the events leading up to
the signing of the MOU require historical and legal explanation. And
similar to the Wilderness Settlement, the implications of this MOU for
the future of wilderness, as well as public participation in decisions about
wilderness, are potentially great.
A. Historical and Statutory Background to the R.S. 2477 MOU
R.S. 2477 is the nickname for a provision in an 1866 mining statute
that granted rights-of-way across unreserved federal public lands. R.S.
2477 succinctly states: "And be it further enacted, That the right of way
for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for pub-
lic uses, is hereby granted."'100 This little statute has been causing a great
deal of legal and political conflict lately, notwithstanding that it was re-
pealed in 1976 with the passage of FLPMA. 10 1 FLPMA grandfathered
in all claims in existence on the date of FLPMA's enactment, 10 2 and the
current battles concern recognition of these pre-1976 claims. Claims un-
der R.S. 2477 are bound up with the battles over wilderness designation.
The wilderness reviews are conducted on "roadless" areas, and while the
congressional definition of wilderness does not necessarily make
roadlessness a criteria, the Wilderness Act does refer to the "untram-
meled" and "undeveloped" nature of eligible federal lands. 10 3 R.S. 2477
claims, if recognized, can become permanent, bladed, or paved roads.
The more R.S. 2477 claims, the more difficult it will be for federal land
99. See Utah v. Norton, No. 2:96CV0870 B (D. Utah Apr. 11, 2003). See also supra note
6 and accompanying text.
100. Act of July 16, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251, Rev. Stat. 2477, codified at 43 U.S.C. §
932 (repealed 1976).
101. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1770 (2000) (outlining procedures under FLPMA for processing
rights of way and repealing all inconsistent legislation).
102. See Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 701(a), 90 Stat. 2786-87 (1976) (uncodified savings provi-
sion of FLPMA stating that rights of way in existence on October 21, 1976 are not terminated).
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2000) (defining wilderness). See also supra notes 12-19 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, in the section on uses in wilderness areas, the Act prohibits
"permanent roads." See § 1133(c). While theoretically it is possible for Congress to designate
a wilderness area that contains roads and then to terminate them, it is unlikely that heavily
roaded lands will be considered worthy of Congressional protection.
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managers to include the areas traversed by these claims in wilderness
proposals.
The resolution of R.S. 2477 disputes depends upon interpretation of
the statutory terms "construction" and "highway." The statute itself does
not define these terms, and there is no legislative history directly on
point. 10 4 Before FLPMA's passage, R.S. 2477 did not attract much at-
tention. From 1934105 to 1976, when FLPMA was passed, the BLM
lacked a mission: the age of disposition had ended, but the age of good
stewardship had not yet begun. As a result, the BLM did little to oversee
recognition of R.S. 2477 claims. What scant interpretation there was be-
fore 1976 does not provide much guidance but does tend to support the
general view that the statutory terms "construction" and "highway" mean
something more than casual routes created by passage. In 1896, the Su-
preme Court decided a case involving interpretation of a parallel provi-
sion of the 1866 Mining Act, which granted rights-of-way for the con-
struction of canals. 10 6  The Court held that the "construction"
requirement was not met in the absence of the "performance of any la-
bor." 10 7 In addition, an 1898 legal decision by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior concluded that a route along section lines, without construction, was
not sufficient to establish a right of way. 108
Today, proponents of looser definitions of "highway" and "con-
struction" rely on various sources of authority that appear to defer to
state law for the interpretation of R.S. 2477 terms. 109 A 1938 regulation
stated that recognition of an R.S. 2477 claim required "construction or
establishing of highways in accordance with the State laws." 110 Some
cases appear to hold that state law cannot only interpret the terms "con-
struction" and "highway" but can read those terms out of existence. 1 1
104. Pamela Baldwin, Highway Rights of Way on Public Lands. R.S. 2477 and Disclaim-
ers of Interest, RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 26, Order Code RL32142 (Nov.
7, 2003) ("There is no legislative history that sheds light on why Congress included the high-
way grant as section 8 in the Mining Act of 1866").
105. See 43 U.S.C. § 315. See also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934).
106. Bear Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co. v. Garland, 164 U.S. 1 (1896).
107. Id. at 18.
108. Right of Way-Highway-Section 2477, R.S., 26 L.D. 446 (1898).
109. See, e.g., Barbara G. Hjelle, Reply to Mr. Lockhart: An Explanation of R.S. 2477
Precedent, 14 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 349 (1994) (arguing that state law
governs recognition of R.S. 2477 claims).
110. Rights of Way for Roads and Highways over Public Land, 3 Fed. Reg. 1035, 1041
(June 1, 1938) (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 244.55 (1938)).
111. See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 104, at 42-46 (analyzing in detail cases that conclude
state law governs establishment of R.S. 2477 claims); Michael J. Wolter, Revised Statutes
2477 Rights-of-Way Settlement Act: Exorcism of Exercise or the Ghost of Land Use Past?, 5
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A thorough and neutral analysis of the issue provided by the Congres-
sional Research Service ("CRS") concludes, however, that these prece-
dents, when examined closely, do not stand for the proposition that state
law can override the statutory requirements."1 2 The CRS Report ends its
analysis of the apparent conflicts over state law and federal law with the
following sensible solution:
If the governing rule is articulated as being that a valid R.S. 2477
highway is one that is both accepted under the laws of the state in
which it is located and also meets the federal requirements, the dispa-
rate body of state cases can be seen as essentially harmonious, and
actual areas of conflict with the federal requirements appear to be
few. This interpretation is also consistent with the [DOI's] earliest,
and most of its subsequent interpretations.
1 13
This articulation of the ease with which a harmonious legal solution
could be reached masks the political turbulence surrounding R.S. 2477
claims. States, counties, and others that oppose what they perceive as
heavy-handed, unilateral actions by the DOI to "lock up" public lands do
not necessarily want legal consistency for the recognition of R.S. 2477
claims. Rather, it is in their best interest to keep nebulous standards alive
so that R.S. 2477 claims can haunt the public lands planning process.
For example, the County Commissioners of Moffatt County, Colorado
passed a resolution asserting more than 2,000 miles of R.S. 2477 claims,
including 240 miles within Dinosaur National Monument. 114 The Mof-
fatt County resolution defines "highway" to include "pedestrian trails,
horse paths, livestock trails, wagon roads, jeep trails, logging roads,
homestead roads, mine-to-market roads, alleys, tunnels, bridges, dirt or
gravel roads, paved roads, and all other ways and their attendant access
for maintenance, reconstruction, and construction." 115 Some of Moffatt
County's asserted claims run along river bottoms and traverse jagged
rocky outcroppings. 116 Similarly, Utah counties have asserted thousands
DiCK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 315, 327-330 (1996) (arguing that state law cannot eviscerate
federal statutory terms that set minimum requirements for the R.S. 2477 grant).
112. Baldwin, supra note 104, at 41-45 (concluding that statements in cases that appear to
sanction state law definitions of R.S. 2477 terms that undermine statutory requirements are
dicta).
113. Id. at46.
114. See A Resolution Recognizing Rights-of-Way Established Over Public Lands Under
R.S. 2477, Moffatt County, Colorado Resolution No. 2003-05, available at http://
co.moffat.co.us/NaturalResources/rightsofway.htm (last vistited June 21, 2004).
115. Id.
116. Examples of R.S. 2477 Proposed Highways in Colorado, at http://
66.84.44.20/2477/O0index.htm (containing photographs of Moffatt County's claims, including
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of R.S. 2477 claims, 117 many of which challenge even the most generous
definition of "highway" and some of which-such as slot canyons and
slick-rock domes-audaciously mock the term.11 8 The parties asserting
these R.S. 2477 rights are very aware of the ways in which their claims
could complicate BLM's ability to prioritize wilderness preservation. 119
A letter from a Moffatt County official to Secretary Gale Norton object-
ing to BLM's plans to manage the Vermillion Basin in order to protect
its wilderness characteristics asserts that many private individuals will be
motivated to "exercise. .. rights under R.S. 2477" by taking actions such
as bulldozing tracks on public lands in order to oppose wilderness desig-
nation. 120 The problem is largely a political one, not a legal one. The
opponents of wilderness designation have adroitly seized on an ancient,
but not dead, law in order to bolster their position in the battle over the
appropriate uses of the public lands.
B. The Terms of the R.S 2477 MOU
The political controversy has kept alive the legal uncertainty regard-
ing how to interpret R.S. 2477. The BLM and Utah assert that the R.S.
2477 MOU is designed to put the legal uncertainties to rest, at least for
claims in that state. Yet the MOU provides very little guidance concern-
ing how the key statutory terms "construction" and "highway" will be
interpreted. The MOU's preamble states that:
Most of the asserted R.S. 2477 rights-of-way that actually have been
part of western states' inventoried and maintained transportation in-
frastructure... satisfy the statutory requirements of "construction"
and "highway" under almost any interpretation of those statutory
terms. 
1 2 1
several in Dinosaur National Monument along the Yampa River) (last visited June 21, 2004).
117. Bloch & McIntosh, supra note 37, at 489-90 (noting that Utah and Utah counties
have asserted between 10,000 and 20,000 claims, many of which are not recognizable as roads
even under very loose standards).
118. R.S. 2477 Photo Gallery, at http://members.aol.com/gshiker999/index.html (contain-
ing photographs of slot canyons and slick rock trails claimed as R.S. 2477 highways by Utah
counties) (last visited June 21, 2004).
119. See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Comstock, Natural Resource Policy Analyst, Moffat
County Natural Resources Department, to Secretary Gale Norton (July 12, 2001) (on file with
author).
120. Id.
121. Memorandum of Understanding Between the State of Utah and the Department of
Interior on State and County Road Acknowledgment 1 (Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://
www.highway-robbery.orgiResources/documents.htm (last visited June 21, 2004) [hereinafter
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This reassuring assertion is not followed by clear definitions of
highway or construction. First, the MOU's title refers to "roads," rather
than highways, and a footnote to the word "roads" states that for the pur-
poses of the MOU, the terms "road" and "highway" are synonymous.122
Proponents of a strict interpretation of the statute's terms would point out
that this is an immediate deviation from the act's requirements. "Road"
and "highway" are not necessarily synonymous, and it is likely that
"highway" implies more human alteration and greater public access than
"road." 123 Second, little else in the MOU gives content to the statutory
terms.
The R.S. 2477 MOU, which lacks a definitions section, first pro-
vides this circular declaration: "existence of the road prior to the enact-
ment of FLPMA is documented by information sufficient to support a
conclusion that the road meets the legal requirements of a right-of-way
granted under R.S. 2477."124 And exactly what are the legal require-
ments of R.S. 2477? The MOU provides only the following minimal
guidance: "the road was and continues to be public and capable of ac-
commodating automobiles or trucks with four wheels and has been the
subject of some type of periodic maintenance." 125 The term "construc-
tion" is never defined independently, so presumably "some type of peri-
odic maintenance" will suffice. 126 The statement in the preamble that
most of the state's R.S. 2477 claims will meet "any" interpretation of the
terms "highway" and "construction"' 127 does not provide much reassur-
ance when the definitions provided set such a low (and nebulous) bar.
How, then, are claimants or the public to know whether there will
be any discernment at all by the BLM in its process of recognizing
claims under the R.S. 2477 MOU? Moreover, why are the terms of the
R.S. 2477 MOU so unclear? There are two possible answers to the sec-
ond question. The first is that, like the Commissioners of Moffatt
County, the BLM recognizes all manner of paths, trails, and routes as
valid R.S. 2477 claims. Whether this is the case or not will be revealed
MOU Between Utah and DOI].
122. Id. at 1 n.1.
123. See Baldwin, supra note 104, at 24 (noting that American dictionaries in use in 1866
indicate that "highway" meant a principal public road, as opposed to "road," which was the
more generic term for any route on which one traveled). Baldwin concludes that "while all
highways are roads, not all roads are highways, since, arguably, highways are public, and are
more significant, built up roads." Id. at 25.
124. MOU Between Utah and DOI, supra note 121, at 3.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1.
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as Utah goes through the process of proposing claims under the MOU. 128
The second is that, regardless of what the BLM's actual standards are or
will be in recognizing claims under the R.S. 2477 MOU, the agency felt
legally constrained not to be too specific for fear of violating a congres-
sional moratorium on making rules pertaining to R.S. 2477.129 The R.S.
2477 MOU does not appear to be a "rule," 130 so how could it violate a
moratorium on rule-making? The R.S. 2477 MOU does not, in and of
itself, include any mechanism for adjudicating or otherwise finalizing
claims brought pursuant to the MOU's terms. Instead, the MOU states
that claims will be acknowledged through the "recordable disclaimer of
interest" process provided for in FLPMA. 13 1 New rules were passed im-
plementing FLPMA's Recordable Disclaimer of Interest provision
(FLPMA § 315),132 and those rules became final on January 6, 2003,'133
three months before Utah and the BLM entered into the R.S. 2477 MOU.
128. Utah filed its first R.S. 2477 claim pursuant to the MOU on January 14, 2004. The
name of the proposed right-of-way is Weiss Road, and it is located in Juab County, in western
Utah. On February 9, 2004, the BLM published a notice in the Federal Register of the claim,
and the comment period was extended to May 8, 2004. For a description of Weiss Road as
submitted to the State of Utah, see http://www.ut.blm.gov/rs2477/weisshighway.htm (last vis-
ited June 21, 2004). Weiss Road, from the photographs on BLM's website, appears to be an
established and maintained gravel road with sloped shoulders indicating mechanical beveling
and construction. See also http://www.ut.blm.gov/rs2477/weisshighway/mapjuabcolor.htm
(last visited June 21, 2004). Other claims on Utah's list, however, do not appear to be quite so
uncontroversial. See, e.g., Rural County Roads: Applications, Forshea Springs Road-Piute
County, at http://www.rs2477.utah.gov/Claims/Forshea/ForsheaGL5.htm (last visited June 21,
2004). Forshea Springs Road is described as "a route for transporting water from the mountain
to the valley, and it is therefore an important road for livestock management." Id. Other uses
are described, but none seem to indicate that the route is a thoroughfare for transporting people
from place to place. In addition, the photos available make the route look as if it is following
the natural contours of the land. Id.
129. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 108,
110 Stat. 3009, 3009-200 (Sept. 30, 1996), available at http://www.highway-
robbery.org/Resources/documents.htm (last visited June 21, 2004). Congress has since relied
on an Opinion of the Comptroller General that section 108 was permanent. See H.R. REP. No.
105-337, at 74 (1997) (citing Opinion of the Comptroller General B-277719 (Aug. 20, 1997))
[hereinafter R.S. 2477 Moratorium].
130. The General Accounting Office, however, concluded that the R.S. 2477 MOU did
qualify as agency rulemaking. See G.A.O. Opinion (Feb. 6, 2004), http://www.rs2477.com/
documents/GAO-Opinion_2_6_04.pdf.
131. See MOU Between Utah and DOI, supra note 121, at 3.
132. 43 U.S.C. § 1745 (2004).
133. Conveyances, Disclaimers, and Correction Documents, 68 Fed. Reg. 494, 494 (Jan. 6,
2003) (amending 43 C.F.R. pt. 1860).
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C. The R.S. 2477 Moratorium and "Recordable Disclaimers of
Interest"
At this point it is necessary to back up a step to explain the R.S.
2477 rule-making moratorium, as well as the disclaimer of interest provi-
sions of FLPMA. The R.S. 2477 controversies that bubbled along
throughout the eighties and early nineties failed to result in any rule-
making by the DOI. Guidance came, instead, in the form of opinion let-
ters and policies. A 1980 letter by a Deputy Solicitor of the Interior,
known as the Ferguson Opinion, shored up the views of the strict R.S.
2477 constructionists, concluding that whether highways had been estab-
lished was a matter of federal law and that "construction" means some
actual building of a road by mechanical means, including for example
culverts, grading, or paving. 134 Then in 1988, the liberal interpreters
won a round when Secretary Hodel adopted a policy to govern R.S. 2477
claims that substantially loosened the requirements for "highway" and
"construction." 135 The Hodel policy allowed pack or pedestrian trails
and toll roads to count as "highways."' 136 For "construction," as little as
moving high vegetation or rocks could count, as could the passage of ve-
hicles over time. 137
The uncertainties created by the various administrative, as well as
judicial, interpretations prompted Congress to address the issue. Unable
to agree on legislation, Congress instead directed the DOI to prepare a
report on R.S. 2477 that would describe the history and current impacts
of R.S. 2477 claims on public lands and propose recommendations for
criteria to determine the validity of R.S. 2477 claims that would be con-
sistent with the intent both of R.S. 2477 and FLPMA. 138 The DOI com-
pleted its report in June 1993.139 Among the recommendations was that
the DOI publish regulations that would establish uniform criteria and
134. See Letter from Frederick Ferguson to James Moorman, Assistant Attorney General
(Apr. 28, 1980), reprinted in UNITED STATES DEP'T OF INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
R.S. 2477: THE HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT OF R.S. 2477 RIGHTS-OF-WAY CLAIMS ON
FEDERAL AND OTHER LANDS, Appendix 1I, Exhibit J (1993), available at http://
www.highway-robbery.org/Resources/documents.htm (last visited June 21, 2004) [hereinafter
Ferguson Opinion].
135. See DEPARTMENTAL POLICY STATEMENT ON SECTION 8 OF THE ACT OF JULY 26,
1866, REVISED STATUTE 2477 (REPEALED), GRANT OF RIGHT-OF-WAY FOR PUBLIC
HIGHWAYS (R.S. 2477) (December 7, 1988), available at http://www.highway-robbery.org/
Resources/documents.htm (last visited June 21, 2004) [hereinafter Hodel Policy].
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. H.R. REP. NO. 102-901, at 71 (1992).
139. Baldwin, supra note 104, at 5.
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processes for recognizing R.S. 2477 claims. 140 Secretary Babbitt pro-
posed such regulations 14' but they met with potent political opposition.
The Babbitt regulations adopted definitions of "construction" and "high-
way" that some members of Congress found to be too onerous. 142 Con-
gress responded by prohibiting Secretary Babbitt from promulgating R.S.
2477 rules. 143 This initial congressional prohibition on R.S. 2477 rule-
making eventually transformed into a permanent one, banning rules "per-
taining to" R.S. 2477 from becoming effective unless approved by Con-
gress.144 In response to the moratorium, Secretary Babbitt issued a pol-
icy memorandum stating that the DOI would not process any R.S. 2477
claims absent a "compelling and immediate need." 145 For any claims
warranting the DOI review, "highway" is defined as "a thoroughfare
used prior to October 21, 1976, by the public for.., passage of vehicles
carrying people or goods from place to place."' 146 "Construction" is re-
quired, though the Babbitt policy does not define the term. 147
Meanwhile, on the ground in Utah, several counties set out to blade
roads across BLM lands. SUWA sued the BLM in order to prompt the
agency to stop the counties from trespassing on federal lands. 148 The
counties defended by asserting that the roads were valid R.S. 2477
claims. 149 The federal litigation was stayed so that the BLM could make
an administrative determination concerning the validity of the counties'
claims. 150 Although the Babbitt policy is not mentioned in the court
opinion, presumably a lawsuit and a court order suffice to meet the pol-
icy's requirement of a "compelling and immediate interest," and the
BLM therefore adjudicated the counties' claims, finding that fifteen out
of sixteen rights-of-way claimed by the counties were not valid R.S.
140. See id.
141. Revised Statute 2477 Rights-of-Way, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (Aug. 1, 1994).
142. Baldwin, supra note 104, at 5 n. 19.
143. National Highway System Designation Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 349, 109
Stat. 568, 617-18 (1995) (prohibiting agencies from promulgating R.S. 2477 rules); Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 110, 110
Stat. 1321-177 (1996) (extending R.S. 2477 prohibition in to 1996 fiscal year).
144. See R.S. 2477 Moratorium, supra note 129.
145. Interim Departmental Policy on Revised Statute 2477 Grant of Right-of-Way for Pub-
lic Highways, Revocation of December 7, 1988 Policy (Jan. 22, 1997), available at http://
www.highway-robbery.org/Resources/documents.htm (last visited June 21, 2004) [hereinafter
Babbitt Policy].
146. Id. at 3.
147. Id.
148. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130,
1133 (D. Utah 2001).
149. Id.
150. Id.
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2477 claims. 151 In adjudicating the counties' claims, the BLM used defi-
nitions of "highway" and "construction" that were in line with the Fergu-
son Opinion 152 and the proposed (and scuttled) Babbitt rules. 153 The
BLM interpreted "construction" to require "[s]ome form of mechanical
construction" and declared that a right-of-way "cannot be established by
haphazard, unintentional, or incomplete actions," including the mere pas-
sage of vehicles. 154 To meet the BLM's definition of "highway," the
claimed route had to be "public in nature ... [and] should lead vehicles
somewhere .... Routes that do not lead to an identifiable destination are
unlikely to qualify."' 155 The counties advocated for much looser defini-
tions, but the federal district court, after a thorough review of the various
sources construing R.S. 2477's terms, affirmed the BLM's interpreta-
tion. 156 The parties urging minimal requirements to establish R.S. 2477
claims were thus dealt a significant setback, even in the absence of for-
mally promulgated regulations. Although the state of Utah was not a
party to the litigation, it had sent a Notice of Intention to File Suit to the
Secretary of the Interior on June 14, 2000, alerting the DOI of its plans to
quiet title to asserted R.S. 2477 claims. 157 In the absence of action by
the Secretary, Utah might have been stuck with the clear definitions of
"construction" and "highway" approved by the federal district court.
This leads us back up to 2003, when the DOI entered into the R.S.
2477 MOU with Utah and published new rules implementing FLPMA §
315, the recordable disclaimer of interest provision. In establishing a
process for the R.S. 2477 MOU that would actually resolve some of
Utah's claims, the DOI had to walk a fine line between providing enough
detail so that the statute itself was not gutted of any meaning, and enough
vagueness so that the moratorium on rule-making was not violated. This
was no easy feat. To allow the disclaimer rules to accommodate federal
acknowledgment of R.S. 2477 rights-of-way, the rules had to be
151. Id. at 1133-34.
152. See Ferguson Opinion, supra note 134, and accompanying text.
153. See Babbitt Policy, supra note 145, and accompanying text.
154. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138
(D. Utah 2001).
155. Id. at 1143.
156. Id. at 1138-45. See also id. at 1135 (articulating level of deference accorded to
BLM's interpretation). The court's review of the legal justification for interpreting R.S.
2477's terms was particularly thorough because the court did not afford full Chevron-style
deference to the BLM. The court correctly noted that informal policy pronouncements, unlike
rules subject to the full notice and comment process required by the Administrative Procedures
Act, "are 'entitled to respect' ... but only to the extent that those interpretations have the
'power to persuade."' Id. at 1135 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)).
157. See MOU Between Utah and DOI, supra note 121, at 2.
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amended. This alone could make the rules ones that "pertain" to R.S.
2477, in violation of the moratorium. In response to comments express-
ing this concern, the DOI asserted that the disclaimer rules do not violate
the moratorium because they merely amend a process for applying to the
government for its acknowledgment that it does not claim an interest in
certain property; they do not "provide standards for recognizing, manag-
ing or validating an R.S. 2477 right-of-way." 158
Yet without the new disclaimer rules, R.S. 2477 claimants would
not have been able to take advantage of § 315 of FLPMA, which pro-
vides, in relevant part, that
the Secretary is authorized to issue a document of disclaimer of inter-
est or interests in any lands in any form suitable for recordation,
where the disclaimer will help remove a cloud on the title of such
lands and where he determines (1) a record interest of the United
States in lands has terminated by operation of law or is otherwise in-
valid .... 159
The old rules required the applicant to be a record owner and imposed a
twelve-year statute of limitations. 160 Because no R.S. 2477 claimant is a
"record owner," and because, by definition, any R.S. 2477 claims that are
still alive are at least eighteen years old, the old rules did not apply to
R.S. 2477 rights-of-way. The new rules eliminate the "owner of record"
requirement and also exempt "states" from the twelve-year statute of
limitations. 161 The new rules also include a very expansive definition of
states, including subdivisions and any "official local governmental enti-
ties,"'162 which are therefore also exempt from the twelve-year statute of
limitations. The Secretary's rationale for the statute of limitations
change is to make the disclaimer rules consistent with the Quiet Title Act
("QTA"), 163 which is the only means by which title disputes can be
brought against the United States. 164 The QTA, however, does not con-
tain the expansive definition of "states," and therefore the disclaimer
rules actually provide broader release from the twelve-year statute of
limitations than the QTA.165 Whether the Secretary's intent was pure or
158. Conveyances, Disclaimers, and Correction Documents, 68 Fed. Reg. 494, 497 (Jan. 6,
2003).
159. 43 U.S.C. § 1745(a) (2004).
160. 43 C.F.R. § 1864.1-3(a)(1) (2002).
161. Id. § 1864.1-3(a).
162. 43 C.F.R. § 1864.0-5(h).
163. 28 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2004).
164. Baldwin, supra note 104, at 8.
165. See id. at 10 (discussing definition of "state" in QTA and court interpretation).
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not, the result is that the disclaimer rules now apply to R.S. 2477 claims,
whether asserted by states, counties, or other "official governmental enti-
ties."
The R.S. 2477 MOU, when quilted together with the new disclaimer
rules, amounts to the functional equivalent of an R.S. 2477 rule. The
R.S. 2477 MOU creates the terms upon which the DOI will officially le-
gitimize R.S. 2477 claims asserted by Utah, and the disclaimer process
provides Utah with the means to achieve an official statement of "no
property interest" from the federal government. This functional equiva-
lence may help explain why the R.S. 2477 MOU itself is so devoid of
clear definitions. The more detailed it is, the more its reference to the
disclaimer process makes the whole package seem like an elaborate eva-
sion of the moratorium. Indeed, it is likely that environmental groups
will challenge the R.S. 2477 MOU and the disclaimer rules on a variety
of grounds, including both exceeding a reasonable interpretation of R.S.
2477 and violating the moratorium. 166 Whether these claims succeed or
fail, the DOI's muscular attempt to accomplish potentially dramatic
shifts in federal lands policy without appearing to do so is notable and
troubling.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CONCERNS ABOUT THE AGENCY
PRACTICE OF SETTLING THE WILDERNESS
When Ralph Nader said during the 2000 presidential race that there
was no difference between Republicans and Democrats, 167 he could not
possibly have been thinking about public lands policy. Ranchers, oil and
gas companies, environmental groups, and many other average citizens
of the West know that the party affiliation of the President matters a
great deal. Why? Because the President staffs the extremely powerful
executive agencies that manage the public lands, and because much of
what these agencies do is reviewable largely only in a procedural
Baldwin notes that "[recent cases have held that the exception for states is to be interpreted
narrowly, such that counties and other subdivisions of a state may not avail themselves of this
exception to the QTA." Id.
166. See BLM Cannot Approve Weiss Highway Disclaimer Application, UTU-8 1100,
Comment Letter Submitted to BLM by Earthjustice on behalf of the Wildemess Society (May
6, 2004), available at http://www.highway-robbery.org/documents/WeissHighway-
May 6_2004.pdf (objecting to approval of Weiss Highway R.S. 2477 claim on grounds that it
violated FLPMA's disclaimer provisions and R.S. 2477 statutory terms).
167. See Kavita Kumar, Nader to Supporters: "Vote Your Conscience," PALM BEACH
POST, Nov. 6, 2000, at 7A (quoting Nader as stating that Democrats and Republicans are the
"same corporate party").
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sense. 168 The Executive's ability to accomplish significant policy shifts
regarding the federal government's vast landholdings is breathtaking. 169
Given that this is the case, the procedural and substantive hooks that al-
low the public to understand, participate in, and attempt to influence pub-
lic lands agencies are particularly valuable. 170 They provide the only
check on the broad exercise of executive discretion, short of congres-
sional legislation. In short, while there is unquestionably wide latitude
given to the Executive Branch to implement public lands policies, the
legislative framework also provides a significant role to the public.
Without that public role, the agencies could quickly become tyrannies of
the public lands, serving only their own and a few special interests. 171
The Wilderness Settlement and the R.S. 2477 MOU upset the delicate
balance of agency discretion and public oversight that is enshrined in the
relevant laws and, in the case of the Wilderness Settlement, even in the
Constitution.
168. The Public Lands statutes (including FLPMA and the National Forest Management
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614) have substantive and procedural aspects that can be enforced by
private citizens through the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706.
Agencies are afforded substantial deference, however, whenever Congress has not "directly
spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). Moreover, even when there is clear congressional direc-
tion, the agencies control the pace and tone with which these directives are met, and failures to
act to protect public lands may often be completely unreviewable. See Norton v. S. Utah Wil-
derness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004).
169. See Blumm, supra note 1, at 10397 (describing this administration's changes to pub-
lic lands policy as a "revolution.").
170. Cf Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposition of
Assets: Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1705,
1771-72 (1999) (arguing for greater public participation and judicial review of government
disposition programs). Krent and Zcppos review the practices of agencies, including the BLM,
that dispose of governmental assets to the public, and conclude that their susceptibility to in-
terest group capture and other market-distorting behaviors require more public scrutiny and
oversight. See generally id. While they are looking only at the narrow issue of BLM's "dis-
position" practices, including mining, oil and gas leasing, and grazing permitting, their obser-
vations apply to the entire BLM operation because of the inextricable nature of these "disposi-
tion" practices with the broader FLPMA land use planning process.
171. Krent & Zeppos aptly noted:
Private entities have successfully lobbied Congress for public resources to subsidize
their own financial activities. Interest group influence continues post-enactment,
with groups exerting leverage to retain legislative benefits. Moreover, private
groups have similarly curried favor with agencies to obtain (or retain) government
largesse. Such governmental subsidization reflects the organizational advantages of
the few who can benefit at the expense of the less well-organized public.
Id. at 1708.
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A. The Wilderness Settlement and the Constitution
The typical constitutional question that arises in the public lands
context is whether the federal government has constitutional authority,
pursuant to the Property Clause, to regulate or conduct activity on or ad-
jacent to federal lands. 172 In general, the answer to this question has
been "yes." 173 In the Utah Wilderness Settlement, the government is re-
straining itself from conducting activities on the public lands. Certainly
there is no Property Clause limitation on the federal government's deci-
sion not to act, even if it could (though there may be statutory limitations
on the government's decision not to act). There are other constitutional
concerns presented by the Wilderness Settlement, however. The BLM's
self-imposed straitjacket raises separation of powers questions that con-
stitutional law commentators have not considered since the 1980s, when
a small number of cases upheld consent decrees against constitutional
challenges1 74 and in response, the Department of Justice ("DOJ"), under
the command of Attorney General Edwin Meese III, issued a "Depart-
ment Policy Regarding Consent Decrees and Settlement Agreements."' 175
These events sparked a discussion about the constitutional parameters of
executive authority to bind the government to certain legal commitments
in settlement agreements. 176
Attorney General Janet Reno rejected the Meese Policy,177 and to
date Attorney General John Ashcroft has not taken a.position on the mat-
ter. It is clear, however, from the Wilderness Settlement that the
Ashcroft Department of Justice has adopted a very liberal view of its
own powers to bind the Executive Branch, including future administra-
tions, to a singular interpretation of the law. The Meese policy prohib-
172. See COGGINS ETAL., supra note 11, at 182-93.
173. See id. at 183-84. See also John Leshy, A Property Clause for the 21s' Century, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1101 (2004).
174. See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 526
(1986) (approving the use of consent decrees that provide even broader relief than the court
could have awarded after trial); Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (holding that a settlement agreement between the Environmental Protection Agency
and environmental groups relating to program for developing Clean Water Act regulations did
not impermissibly infringe on agency discretion committed to it by Congress); United States v.
Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. I11. 1983) (approving consent decree).
175. Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Commentary: The Attorney General's Policy on Consent De-
crees and Settlement Agreements, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 101, 101 (1987).
176. See generally Symposium, Consent Decrees: Practical Problems and Legal Dilem-
mas, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1 (1987).
177. See United States Department of Justice, Authority of the United States to Enter Set-
tlements Limiting the Future Exercise of Executive Branch Discretion, http://www.usdoj.gov/
olc/consentdecrees2.htm.
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ited terms in consent decrees "that divest the Secretary or agency admin-
istrator, or his successors, of discretion committed to him by Congress or
the Constitution where such discretionary power was granted to respond
to changing circumstances, to make policy or managerial choices, or to
protect the rights of third parties."' 178 The Meese Justice Department
specified two reasons for the policy. 179 The DOJ sought first to avoid
binding future administrations in the exercise of their agency discretion,
and second to protect the discretion of the Executive Branch from an in-
trusive exercise of judicial power in enforcing consent decrees that create
obligations that the court itself could not have imposed after a trial. 180
The Meese policy did not allude to constitutional concerns, but
commentators have since put concerns about consent decrees into consti-
tutional context. The peculiar nature of consent decrees forms the basis
for the constitutional risks they pose. Consent decrees "have attributes
both of contracts and of judicial decrees." 18 1 They are contractual in that
they are a consensual agreement between parties, the consideration for
which is abandoning litigation. But unlike contracts, they are adopted by
a court as a final order and decree and are enforceable according to terms
dictated, not by the Judicial Branch after due consideration of the facts
and law, but by the parties themselves.1 82 Notwithstanding the court's
lack of involvement in determining a decree's terms, the court must en-
force those terms just as it would any other final injunctive relief.18 3
Consent decrees therefore have the potential to bind future admini-
strations to a legal position that has never been adjudicated. The consti-
tutional risks identified by scholars are two-fold: first, Article II concerns
are raised by the specter of one Executive Branch binding a future Ex-
ecutive Branch; 184 second, Article III problems are presented by the
courts being enlisted to interfere unduly in the exercise of executive
178. Jost, supra note 175, at 102-03 (quoting Memorandum from Edwin Meese 1II, Attor-
ney General, to All Assistant Attorneys General and All United States Attorneys, at 3 (Mar.
13, 1986) (concerning Dcpartment policy with regard to consent decrees and settlement
agreements)),
179. Id. at 104.
180. Id. at 104-05. Professor Jost opines that the policy was also intended to centralize
political control over troublesome, judicially enforceable agreements and to serve as a negoti-
ating tool by imposing certain outer limits on settlement terms. Id. at 105-06.
181. United States v. ITT Cont'l Banking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n.10 (1975).
182. Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Con-
stitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN.
L. REv. 203, 205 (1987).
183. Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate
Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 296 (1987).
184. Id. at 300. See also Rabkin & Devins, supra note 182, at 219-220.
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powers. 185 These concerns are interrelated, in that the Executive could
not impermissibly constrain future Executives (the Article II concern)
without recruiting the Judicial Branch, and the Judicial Branch could not
overstep its constitutional boundary of hearing "cases and controversies"
unless the federal party to the consent decree is ceding powers beyond
those within its capacity to cede. 186
Notwithstanding the constitutional risks, courts have left it largely
to the Executive Branch to avoid the problematic consequences of set-
tlement agreements. 187 Some scholars have urged that in addition to ab-
dicating their constitutional obligations, the courts invite behavior that
abuses democratic principles. 188 These abuses come in several forms.
First, federal agencies might "placate particular parties at the expense of
their broader policy responsibilities to the general public."' 189 Second,
agencies are invited to "evade proper accountability by securing a judi-
cial imprimatur for their own disputable policy choices." 190 Third, al-
lowing one administration to bind successors undermines electoral pre-
rogatives and therefore democratic accountability. 191
The Wilderness Settlement presents both the constitutional concerns
and the specter of practical abuses. With respect to the Article II con-
cerns, by recruiting the court to side with a particular interpretation of
FLPMA (an interpretation with no legal or administrative precedent), 192
the Secretary locked in that interpretation in a way that would not have
been possible pursuant to her own authority. 193 While Secretary Norton
was free to change course with respect to all land use planning conducted
under her own administration, she would not, in the absence of the Wil-
derness Settlement, have been able to guarantee to Utah that future ad-
ministrations would take the position that FLPMA prohibits wilderness
inventories and interim standards of management that protect wilderness
qualities. 194 With respect to the Babbitt wilderness inventory, the Article
185. See Rabkin & Devins, supra note 182, at 257.
186. See id. at 243 (discussing interrelationship between separation of powers and Article
III concerns).
187. See id. at 205 ("[N]o appellate decision on the subject has yet offered a clear ruling
on the underlying constitutional issues"). This remains true today.
188. See id. at 269. See also McConnell, supra note 183, at 297.
189. Rabkin & Devins, supra note 182, at 270.
190. Id.
191. Id. See also McConnell, supra note 183, at 299-300.
192. See supra Section I.C.
193. McConnell, supra note 183, at 301-04.
194. See Stipulation and Joint Motion to Enter Order Approving Settlement and to Dismiss
the Third Amended and Supplemented Complaint at 12-13, Utah v. Norton, No. 2:96CV0870
B (D. Utah Apr. 1, 2003). See also McConnell, supra note 183, at 303 (proposing that con-
sent decrees should only be enforceable if the government signatory has authority, other than
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II and Article III concerns converge. In Utah v. Babbitt,195 the court
held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Babbitt reinven-
tory. 196 Only the de facto management of BLM as wilderness challenge
remained alive in the litigation.197 Yet the Wilderness Settlement dis-
avows legal authority for the Babbitt reinventory. 198 In approving the
Wilderness Settlement, the district court therefore allowed the Secretary
to resolve, by judicial decree, a matter that the court, according to the
Tenth Circuit, lacked constitutional authority to hear. 199
The three practical concerns raised by scholars are all present in the
Wilderness Settlement as well. First, the Settlement placates the state
parties, adopting wholesale their legal position, at the expense of the le-
gal and policy positions of members of the public.200 The fact that envi-
ronmental groups filed petitions to intervene that the district court never
considered, and that the Wilderness Settlement underwent expedited
consideration in the district court while the petitions to intervene were
pending, 20 1 heightens this concern. Second, the dearth of legal support
for the Secretary's position concerning FLPMA's constraints on wilder-
ness inventories and protection bolsters the critique that the administra-
tion was seeking judicial cover for a questionable policy choice. 202 Fi-
nally, the Wilderness Settlement undermines the public's ability to
change BLM's wilderness-stingy direction by contacting public officials
or even voting for a different administration. 203 Even if the public's de-
sire for a policy change is strong enough to influence electoral outcomes,
the Wilderness Settlement purports to lock in a particular interpretation
of FLPMA's wilderness-related provisions.
from the decree itself, to bind the discretion of present and future officeholders).
195. 137 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 1998).
196. Id. at 1197.
197. Id. at 1215.
198. Stipulation and Joint Motion to Enter Order Approving Settlement and to Dismiss the
Third Amended and Supplemented Complaint at 9-10, 12-13, Norton, 2:96CV0870 B.
199. Rabkin & Devins, supra note 182, at 223 (describing Article III limitations, including
standing requirements). See also id. at 265 (commending a court for raising standing questions
in the context of rejecting a proposed settlement).
200. See id. at 270 (describing abuse of placating certain parties at the expense of other
members of the public).
201. See supra Section L.C (analyzing legal positions adopted in the Wilderness Settle-
ment).
202. Rabkin & Devins, supra note 182, at 270 (noting that administrations might abuse
consent decrees by seeking judicial "imprimatur" for questionable policy choices).
203. See id. and McConnell, supra note 183, at 297 (both expressing concerns about un-
dermining agency accountability to the general public, which is typically accomplished
through voting and contacting agency officials).
1190 [Vol. 75
SETTLING THE WILDERNESS
As noted above, federal courts have been reluctant to impose consti-
tutional constraints on the Executive's ability to enter into consent de-
crees. With the exception of the standing concem,20 4 it is therefore un-
clear whether the separation of powers questions raised by the
Wilderness Settlement will persuade a court to set aside the consent de-
cree. Yet the foregoing discussion highlights the substantial risks to val-
ues of public accountability and statutory fidelity if the Executive Branch
is left to police itself.
B. Agencies, Public Lands, and Public Participation
Unlike the Wilderness Settlement, the R.S. 2477 MOU is not en-
shrined in a judicially enforceable decree. The R.S. 2477 MOU therefore
does not present the same legally cognizable constitutional issues. As a
practical matter, however, the R.S. 2477 MOU has the potential to im-
pact public lands policies as concretely and as permanently as the Wil-
derness Settlement. If the BLM proceeds to recognize even a proportion
of the claims on Utah's list, let alone any of the claims asserted by Utah
counties, BLM's ability to protect lands for their wilderness qualities will
be greatly compromised. The R.S. 2477 MOU and the Wilderness Set-
tlement together represent serious challenges to the BLM's authority to
protect the wilderness and associated environmental values of BLM
lands, and the public's ability to influence BLM management authority.
The legal and historical details of these two agreements between the
BLM and Utah present serious questions about the authority of federal
public lands agencies. The complexity of both of these stories makes
them fairly inaccessible to the average citizen. And yet these obscure,
highly technical maneuvers and legal interpretations determine the fate
of public lands in which, as of today, the average citizen has a legitimate
legal interest. The approach of capitulating to special interest groups (in
this case states and counties, with extractive industries looming in the
background) 20 5 appears inconsistent with Secretary Norton's stated pol-
icy of "the 4C's: communication, consultation, cooperation, all in the
service of conservation." 20 6 The full implications and details of the Utah
settlements are difficult to communicate to the public; interested parties
were not consulted; cooperation with interested members of the public is
204. Rabkin & Devins, supra note 182, at 265 (discussing D.C. Circuit opinion that raised
standing issue).
205. See Blumm, supra note 1, at 10420 (concluding that extractive industries drive Bush
administration policies on public lands disputes).
206. U.S. Department of Interior, Welcome from Secretary Gale Norton, http://www.doi.
gov/welcome.html (last visited on May 11, 2004).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
therefore not in evidence, and the "conservation" goals are elusive, to say
the least. The point, however, is not to criticize this particular admini-
stration. It seems entirely likely that strenuous agency action excising an
entire community's point of view, and making indelible marks on public
lands management, would be objectionable to whichever community was
on the short end of the agency's policy agenda. 20 7 The particularly dis-
turbing aspect of these attempts to "settle the wilderness" is the sub rosa
nature of this kind of policy making. Many have criticized the federal
government's management of the public lands.20 8 But as long as the fed-
eral government is still the manager of just under one-third of the na-
tion's lands, one of the primary virtues is that the entire spectrum of pub-
lic opinion can be taken into account. Doing so is slow, inefficient, and
frustrating. Yet short-circuiting this cumbersome democratic process not
only runs the risk of violating the governing statutes209 but also of inter-
fering with the very essence of what is good about a legal structure that
creates a grand, albeit contentious, federal commons. What is good is
the ongoing and open public debate about what should happen to our re-
maining wildlands and resources. The Utah settlements end that debate,
without acknowledging that they are doing so. Agencies, without the
scrutiny of courts, Congress, or the public, are quietly making drastic
changes in policy. In an age in which we have acknowledged the impor-
tance of agency expertise and have willingly made trade-offs between
democratic control and agency knowledge, such approaches take a step
too far.2 10 Current constitutional doctrines of separation of powers may
not be able to address this elusive and complex form of agency over-
reaching, but that should serve only to heighten our attentiveness to the
problem.
CONCLUSION
Settling the wilderness through consent decrees and MOUs is not
likely to actually settle the legal issues. Litigation is, and will be, ongo-
207. See generally DANIEL KEMMIS, THIS SOVEREIGN LAND (2001) (describing views of
many westerners that Democratic policies excluded their voices and concerns from public
lands decisions).
208. See, e.g., id. See also COGGINS ET AL., supra note 11, at 20-27 (excerpting a handful
of articles that critique public lands management from a variety of perspectives); Krent &
Zeppos, supra note 170 (criticizing public lands disposal practices).
209. See supra Sections I.C and II.B-C, (discussing possible violations of FLPMA and
R.S. 2477).
210. See Krent & Zeppos, supra note 170, at 1771-72 (arguing that the cure for agency
capture and mismanagement is more public participation and judicial accountability).
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ing. Constitutional issues will be raised, and either reached or avoided
by the courts. Judges will decide whether the agencies' interpretations of
statutes are reasonable. In the meantime, parcels within areas identified
by the BLM as having wilderness characteristics are being leased for oil
and gas extraction. Routes claimed as highways leave BLM lands vul-
nerable in the planning process. And energy is devoted to fighting myr-
iad legal battles instead of coming to reasonable solutions about how best
to manage the public lands.
Perhaps, instead of settling the wilderness, government agencies
could sit down with all members of the interested public and actually set-
tle the contentiousness. Rather than engage in lawyer games about rea-
sonable interpretations of FLPMA and whether rules "pertaining" to R.S.
2477 include recordable disclaimers of interest, why not start with ideas
about the public lands themselves. How much wilderness is too much?
There are 22.9 million acres of BLM lands in Utah. Is 5.8 million acres
of wilderness, the amount identified by the BLM in its reinventory, 211
really too much? With respect to R.S. 2477, if the routes the BLM in-
tends to recognize really are "highways," according to anyone's defini-
tion, why not provide that definition? In other words, why not take on
the substance of the issues up front, with all the parties who have so pas-
sionately claimed an interest in these matters-the states, the counties,
the ranchers, the folks who traipsed about for years on those bone dry
BLM lands, learning every corner of them to be able to make their case
about wilderness values. Everyone has an interest who has claimed one.
At the moment, it seems unlikely, under any administration, that the po-
larization will cease. The cycle of "one for us, one for them" seems
firmly set in motion. Indeed, the strategy of entering into quiet settle-
ments is a procedural upping of the ante in this regard: "One for us, and
not one for you!"
But perhaps I am too pessimistic. Maybe we should suspend judg-
ment. The R.S. 2477 claims will start rolling in, and maybe Utah and the
BLM will only recognize the routes that we would all agree are "high-
ways." As for wilderness, perhaps the BLM will find creative ways to
protect most of the wilderness-identified lands outside of formal WSA
status, though that one seems less likely. And then we are depriving fu-
ture Congresses and future generations of the chance to protect what lit-
tle there is left: 5.8 million out of 22.9 million. Can we settle the fight
for the soul of the region without settling the wilderness? That is the
challenge.
211. See Hayes, supra note 28, at 223.
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